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The paper attempts to identify future directions for public 
administration in the context of changes in the political 
system, and especially changes in the executive branch of 
government. Administrative reforms in the past few dec-
ades have been characterized by the New Public Manage-
ment, governance, public participation, empowerment, 
etc. At the same time, the political executive itself has been 
undergoing a range of significant changes. Also, the role 
of the political executive within the political process has 
been changing, especially within parliamentary systems. 
»Presidentialization« of politics in parliamentary systems 
is connected with domination of prime ministers over their 
cabinets and political processes in general. The result of 
such administrative and political processes is a paradoxical 
position of the political leadership that concentrates more 
power on the peak of the political system, while it has di-
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minished power over administration and implementation. 
However, there are some mechanisms for maintaining 
many of the gains of modern administrative reforms while 
allowing firmer political steering. Four of them are ana-
lysed: soft steering, priority setting, the use of a »golden 
thread«, and performance management. Maintenance of 
a career and stable civil service is crucial for resolving dis-
juncture between current political and administrative proc-
esses.  
Key words: public administration, administrative reforms, 
the New Public Management, democratic governance, po-
litical executives, presidentialization of parliamentary sys-
tems, public participation, civil service
1. Introduction
The past several decades have been ones of substantial and continuing 
change in the public sector (Aucoin, 1990; Peters and Savoie, 2000). 
These individual reforms are far too numerous to enumerate and evaluate 
here, although the changes are usually encapsulated in terms of the New 
Public Management (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007). While these mar-
ket-oriented reforms of New Public Management (NPM) were the most 
commonly discussed aspects of reform, there also have been numerous 
attempts to make the public sector more participatory and democratic. 
These efforts have included notable efforts within a number of countries 
to enhance many aspects of »citizen engagement« in the processes of gov-
erning (Wyman, Shulman and Ham, 2000; Pierre and Eymeri-Douzanes, 
2011).   
Despite the numerous attempts to enhance participation, there are a 
number of questions remaining about the capacity of the public to control 
government and its bureaucracy effectively through democratic means. 
This paper will examine some of those attempts, especially those that have 
been attempts to ameliorate the worst effects of NPM. Not only have 
these reforms attempted to foster greater participation per se but they 
have also attempted to enhance steering and control from political execu-
tives. This paper will examine the attempts to enhance political controls, 
and also to move the public sector toward a more strategic style of gov-
erning.
607
B. Guy Peters: After Managerialism What? ...







The administrative reforms have produced some demonstrable benefits 
for the public sector and for citizens. Although citizens in many countries 
remain sceptical about government, or in many cases have merely grown 
even more sceptical (see Norris, 2011), about the performance of the 
public sector, there does appear to have been some improvements in the 
services delivered (Rouban, 2001). If nothing else, the emphasis on per-
formance and »serving the customer« that has been central to the New 
Public Management has enabled the public to identify somewhat more 
clearly how well services are being provided, and how much those serv-
ices have been improving over time.1 Instruments used to assess service 
delivery, such as performance management, may be flawed in many ways 
(Pollitt, 2009; Bouckaert and Peters, 2002) but again they also emphasize 
the need for the public sector.
The emphasis on citizen engagement, and the associated involvement of 
social actors in making and implementing public policies (Torfing et al., 
2012), has also improved the democratic performance of many admin-
istrative systems (see Fountain, 2001). Most of these opportunities for 
participation are relevant primarily for organized groups in the civil soci-
ety, but there are also opportunities for individual involvement with the 
output side of the public sector. Given the declining relevance of conven-
tional forms of participation in many countries, there has been some shift 
toward the administrative system as a locus of democracy (Peters, 2010). 
While this form of democracy does not necessarily replace conventional 
democratic participation, opportunities to participate directly with the 
bureaucracy do complement those other forms.  
This paper will attempt to locate future directions for public administra-
tion in the context of even broader changes in the political system, and 
especially changes in the executive branch of government. While the pub-
lic administration community has been concentrating attention on the 
numerous reforms within that part of government, it might be easy to 
ignore (as scholars if not as citizens) the significant changes occurring in 
others. I will be attempting to link these seemingly contradictory direc-
tions of change and discuss their impacts on the role that the senior public 
service plays in governing.
1  The transformation of »citizens« into »customers« has decidedly negative normative 
implications for democracy, but this basic emphasis on providing services does have more 
positive implications.
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It is always crucial to remember that public administration is indeed pub-
lic. The public bureaucracy is a central component of the political system, 
rather than merely a technical and managerial activity (Olsen, 2008). The 
public bureaucracy is linked intimately to the political executive (Peters, 
1987; Jenkins, 2008), both as it provides advice to those political lead-
ers and it is responsible for implementing the programs of ministers and 
other political executives. Further, the public bureaucracy remains, even 
after the increased use of non-governmental actors, the principal source 
of contact between the State and members of the public. Public admin-
istration therefore becomes the mechanism through which the public re-
ceives subtle, and perhaps not so subtle, indications about the way in 
which governments regard their position as citizens and as »customers« 
(Serra, 1995).
2. Conflicts in Reforming Public Administration
Much of the discussion of public administration during the past several 
decades has been, in essence, directed at promoting change from the bot-
tom up. All the reforms associated with the New Public Management, as 
well as most of the »governance« reforms have tended to emphasize the 
importance of lower echelon public servants and the connection between 
civil society and government. Although the New Public Management has 
had some emphasis on the role of managers, and even the senior man-
agers, when viewed from the perspective of senior political officials, the 
emphasis has been on individuals much further down in the governing 
system, the ultimate ambition of the approach is to enhance quality in the 
provision of public services.    
Indeed, part of the political logic of the New Public Management has 
been to denigrate the role of political leaders and to extol the presumed 
capacity of public managers to provide more effective leadership for, and 
control over, public policy. These reforms have included diverting a good 
deal of the activity for providing public services to non-governmental ac-
tors and to relatively autonomous agencies within the public sector (Ver-
hoest, 2005). These reforms, and associated decentralization within the 
public sector itself, have tended to move power out of the centre of gov-
ernment and apparently minimize the control that politicians have over 
policy. 
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The alternative pattern of reform in the public sector, that has emphasized 
the participation of citizens directly in administration and policy-making, 
has had some of the same consequences for the capacity of political lead-
ers to steer public policy. There is a variety of mechanisms for involving 
the public in decisions, e.g. participatory budgeting (Tellier, 2011), and 
for enhancing the involvement of lower-echelon employees in the opera-
tions of their organizations (Vigoda and Golembiewski, 2001). These re-
forms have enhanced the democratic quality of public administration but 
they have also tended to enhance the autonomy of public organizations, 
and consequently have tended to reduce another element of democratic 
steering, i.e. the capacity of elected leaders to control policy.   
The administrative reforms of the past several decades have rather had the 
consequence of attempting to empower a number of actors in the admin-
istrative process. These changes have in various ways and through various 
means intended to empower senior managers, lower echelon administra-
tors, clients, and ordinary citizens. As we have pointed out previously (Pe-
ters and Pierre, 2000), these reforms have tended to empower everyone 
and in the process may heave laid the basis for political conflicts within 
organizations and between organizations and their publics. Further, the 
reforms have tended to disaggregate the public sector to the extent that 
the inherent difficulties of coordination within the public sector become 
exacerbated, and collective governance even more constrained than under 
the traditional forms of governance. 
3. Public Administration from the Top Down
As already noted, there has been a great deal of reform in public adminis-
tration that appears to have been conducted in isolation from the political 
context within which that administration functions. At the same time that 
administrative systems have been reformed, the political executive has 
itself been undergoing a range of significant changes in its structures, in 
its functions, and also in how it interacts with public administration (see 
Dahlström, Peters and Pierre, 2011; Hood and Lodge, 2008). Further, 
and perhaps most importantly, the role of the political executive within 
the political process has been changing, especially within parliamentary 
systems.2
2  This is the recent manifestation of a long-term change in the relative powers of 
parliament. 
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3.1. The Changing Executive
The recent transformations of the political executive in parliamentary sys-
tems is usually referred to as the »presidentialization« of these systems 
(Poguntke and Webb, 2007; Bevir and Rhodes, 2006). In this political 
context presidentialization means that prime ministers have ceased to 
be »primus inter pares« (if they ever really were) and instead have come 
to dominate their cabinets and the political process more generally. This 
»presidentialization« of politics3 in parliamentary systems has been associ-
ated with not only the trappings of political power-expanded staffs, media 
officers and media attention, in these offices but also the growth of real 
powers. The capacity of prime ministers to control policymaking within 
cabinet has increased in many political systems, as have decree powers to 
govern autonomously in some instances (Carey and Shugart, 1998).
Prime ministers have gained control of much of the decision-making ap-
paratus in cabinet and parliament and also have control over their po-
litical parties. The desire of individual politicians to retain their positions 
and hopefully climb up the career ladder makes them relatively easy to 
control by the party leadership and thus majorities in parliament can be 
solidified. That pattern of dominance by premiers is accentuated by the 
tendency of major political parties in parliamentary systems to become 
»cartel parties« (Katz and Mair, 2009). That is, they have become even 
more concerned with maintaining office, and in the process minimizing 
their representational roles. In coalition systems this tendency can extend 
to downplaying the role of opposition in parliament so that the party can 
be considered a reliable coalition partner.4 Further, as holding office be-
comes more important, the costs of defection for any individual politician 
become greater.
The basic argument then is that parliamentary democracies have been 
translated into cabinet democracies, and cabinet democracies have be-
come prime ministerial democracies. The political focus on these execu-
3  This term as applied to parliamentary systems is a serious misnomer. Presidents 
are in many ways weaker officials than are prime ministers, especially contemporary prime 
ministers. Presidents generally lack controls over their legislative branches and hence are 
less capable of making definitive policy decisions than are prime ministers – especially prime 
ministers in majoritarian political systems such as (usually) the United State or Canada. See 
Peters (1997).
4  An increasing amount of the work of opposition therefore is carried out by flash 
parties often built around a single issue and around an individual, perhaps not running in 
more than one or two elections. 
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tives has tended to alter the internal dynamics of governing and to make 
parliamentary accountability more difficult. Although there are some ten-
dencies for change in that direction, there are marked differences across 
political systems. The majoritarian (Lijphart, 1994), Westminster systems 
appear to have gone the furthest in that direction, while more consen-
sual regimes with coalition systems have changed less. Even among those 
systems, however, there are differences. Systems with a Ressortsprinzip 
such as Germany or Denmark give individual ministers structural power 
to make decisions on their own, while those such as Sweden insist on a 
stronger sense of the unity of governments.
Thus, within government itself, ministers and especially prime ministers 
have acquired substantial political power, and power over the internal ma-
chinery of government. In addition to their role in managing the politi-
cal process, they have also built policy capacity that is distinct from that 
which conventionally had been run through the civil service. The prolifera-
tion of SPADs (special advisers) in government is one manifestation of 
the attempt to politicize policy-making and to use political »spin« in the 
management of governing. Importantly much of the role of these advisors 
is political rather than political analytic so that »spin« is indeed major part 
of the role (see Eichbaum and Shaw, 2010).
The administrative reforms over the past several decades have also influ-
enced the nature of the political executives. On the one hand, the em-
phasis on management as opposed to policy advice within these reforms 
has denigrated and downgraded the policy capacity of the senior public 
service in many countries. Management has improved in many cases, but 
that has been bought by creating a civil service that often is less capable of 
providing »frank and fearless«, and well-reasoned, advice to their nominal 
political masters. Therefore, those political executives have had to rely 
more on their own sources of advice, and that advice has become increas-
ingly politicized (Fawcett and Gay, 2010).
In addition, the emphasis on public participation in governing and poli-
cymaking has tended to create some more competitors for influence over 
policy, and an increased range of policy ideas that may be considered 
in the policy process. The political executives may have their own spin-
doctors hard at work, but there are other political organizations, and even 
more civil society organizations, at work also trying to gain control over 
the discourses used to define and to control policy. The democratization 
of administration and other policy processes therefore also tend to weaken 
the capacity of political executives to control policy, even as they appear 
ever more powerful within the structures of government themselves.   
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Finally, the disaggregation of the political and bureaucratic executives 
into numerous autonomous agencies, as well as the use of the multiple 
means for non-governmental organizations in delivering public services, 
have had a significant effect on the capacity of political executives to con-
trol public policy.  This effect can be most obvious at implementation 
stage of the policy process, but is also true during formulation of policy.5 
This »decentring« of government provides another source of policy direc-
tion and also creates that many more autonomous actors within the proc-
ess that determine choices.  
Given the above changes, the centre of government has been engaged in 
a number of efforts to build not only policy capacity but also the capacity 
to coordinate and integrate the policies and programmes being imple-
mented (and developed) by more devolved structures. This has meant 
developing formal structures or procedures to handle these issues (Runio 
and Kekkonen, 2011; Smith, 2011) or simply emphasizing the need to 
»recreate the centre« of the system. No matter what the character of the 
response, there has been a perceived need to restore important aspects of 
the political power of the centre.
At the extreme the movement toward greater direct participation by the 
public in policymaking, and the use of more or less autonomous actors, 
has been manifested in »interactive governance« (Torfing et al., 2012). 
In numerous political systems, especially those in Northern Europe, a 
number of policy areas are heavily influenced, some would argue domi-
nated, by social actors who are capable of making and implementing pub-
lic policies by cooperative means, rather than the more hierarchical means 
usually associated with the public sector. This mechanism for making and 
delivering services tends to place even great barriers in the way of political 
elites who want to steer governance.
The separation of the two groups of executives – political and bureau-
cratic – represents yet another case of mutual empowerment in governing. 
Within the political group, executive cabinets and especially prime min-
isters have definitely been empowered. They have built powerful political 
and governing institutions around themselves, and appear capable of con-
trolling much of the action within the political side of governing. At the 
5  It is crucial to remember here that »mere implementation« is not that, but is crucial 
for shaping the nature of the policies being delivered. The policy as implemented is arguably 
much more important than is the policy that resides in formal papers in cabinet or parlia-
ment.
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same time, within the bureaucracy, New Public Management reforms as 
well as democratizing reforms have tended to empower many actors.  
Both of these groups believe that they have both the legitimacy and the 
capacity to govern, and to govern well. At the same time, however, they 
also express some perceived problems in the state of contemporary gov-
ernance. This tendency to identify governance problems has been espe-
cially true for political executives, who have expressed their perception 
that many aspects of governing are beyond their capacity to control. The 
public administrators involved in this process at times express concerns 
over their loss of influence over policy, and also (somewhat paradoxically) 
about the demands to manage policy.
As Richard Rose (1976) noted there are numerous constraints on the ca-
pacity of political leaders to control the remainder of the political system. 
These included the lack of policy expertise, management skills and time 
on the part of the political executives. In the decades that have followed 
the publication of Rose’s book the difficulties in governing from the cen-
tre may have, if anything, increased as policy problems and the delivery 
systems associated with them have become increasingly complex. The de-
velopment and use of policy »shops« in the executive has varied across 
time, with the period of presidentialization being marked as much by po-
litical as by genuine policy advice.
Further, there was no guarantee that the remainder of the department 
would want to go along with the policies of a minister. One of the prevail-
ing stereotypes of public administration is of a collection of permanent 
officials who have their own ideas about policy and who are not about 
to be swayed by the wishes of their political masters. That stereotype is 
generally overstated quite dramatically, but yet it must be said that de-
partments do have their perspectives on policy and will attempt to move 
their ministers in particular directions, at times saving the minister from 
his or her own best instincts. That stereotype becomes even less valid as 
the administrative and policy-delivery systems become more decentred, 
and more autonomous.
This general decline in the apparent capacity of political executives to 
control their ministries has had several recent counter-trends, brought 
on in part by the economic crisis beginning in 2008. One has been a 
general centralization of government, perceived to be necessary to cope 
with the disruptions of that economic crisis. In the extreme, the power of 
central actors such as prime ministers and ministers of finance has been 
strengthened by the International Monetary Fund and the European Un-
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ion. Perhaps less obviously, the number and autonomy of agencies and 
other decentralized structures has been reduced as governments attempt 
to ensure their capacity to work together.
In this rather paradoxical world of the contemporary political executives, 
many are attempting to find ways of controlling policy the same way in 
which they can control their own offices. Interviews with several leaders in 
central agencies in a range of countries indicate that chief executives find 
it difficult to exercise the type of control over governance that they ex-
pected to be capable of prior to election. They have a great deal of power 
within their own political executive but that power appears to run into the 
sand once they attempt to motivate the remainder of the executive.
4. Knitting Together Strands of Change
These diverging patterns of governance and the role of public adminis-
tration create an important paradox of governance in the contemporary 
world. On the one hand, the continuing expansion of the use of non-
governmental actors in governing, and delegation to sub-national political 
systems, has meant that the political leadership in governments are »steer-
ing at a distance« (Kickert, 1995), and the chains of control that exist in 
contemporary governance have become attenuated. On the other hand, 
however, cabinets and especially prime ministers have come to dominate 
the political institutions of government, so that power within the political 
system has gravitated upward to the peak of the political executive.
The paradox then is that prime minister appears to have, and indeed has, 
immense power within the executive, but at the same time often has di-
minished power over the remainder of the political system. This para-
doxical position of the political leadership in contemporary government 
has both democratic and administrative consequences. The democratic 
element of this paradox is to some extent an extension of problems that 
have existed in parliamentary regimes for some time. As Rose pointed 
out when we go to the polls on election day, we may think that we are 
selecting policies, but there have been many barriers to that model of 
democracy actually functioning. And those barriers have if anything been 
increasing as a function of administrative reforms (see Dahlström, Peters 
and Pierre, 2011).
Even with the power and the trappings of power that ministers and espe-
cially prime ministers have created for themselves over the past several 
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decades, they may be at something of a disadvantage in making public 
policies. The centre of government has always been political, but has if 
anything become more political. That is, the twenty-four hour news cycle, 
the increased transparency of governing because of the media, and the 
focus on prime ministers tends to drive political concerns to the top of the 
list and issues of good policy (especially long-term policy) and good gov-
ernance somewhat further down the list of priorities. The »Court Govern-
ment« metaphor that Savoie (2008) developed captures this rather inward 
looking style of a good deal of contemporary governing.
If the above arguments about the seeming disjuncture of power and policy 
within the executive branch have any validity, then the civil service, and 
especially the senior civil service, has some major challenges. While this 
institution has always been central to governing, it becomes even more 
so as it must somehow »knit« together disparate strands of the contem-
porary governance system into a more coherent and integrated format 
for governing. This must be done in a manner that preserves some of the 
gains from improved management but can add to that policy direction 
and that can emphasize »the primacy of politics«.
The civil service has traditionally been the central lynchpin connecting the 
political elements of the executive branch with the administrative. In a 
more traditional version of governance than we now typically see, admin-
istrative elites such as Deputy Ministers or Permanent Secretaries were 
crucial in that linkage, conveying the political authority of the minister 
downward into the remainder of government, and conveying ideas and 
the »departmental view« upwards to the political echelons. These officials 
required the confidence of both groups of actors to be successful and had 
to function as honest brokers between the wishes of the political master 
and the established routines, and policy wishes, of the department.
This role of linkage between the top and the bottom of government has 
been to some extent degraded by the politicization within the administra-
tive system, and the increasing use of political officials to perform this 
task of connecting the levels within the public sector.6 That politicization 
takes many forms (Peters, forthcoming) but in all instances involves the 
substitution of political values for those of the civil service, and the loss of 
the autonomy and professionalism of the civil service.
6  This linkage role has been played by political appointees in systems such as France 
and Belgium that have extensive ministerial cabinets (Brans and Pelgrims, 2006). While 
many of these officials in the cabinets come from administration, they adopt a political role 
serving their minister.  
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The emerging demands on the civil service in these processes of linking 
the political and the administrative will be even more important. And that 
must be done within a context in which there is greater separation, struc-
turally and behaviourally, between the two segments of the executive. 
And in addition, it must be accomplished in an era in which many partici-
pants in public administration have become somewhat more autonomous 
in general, and therefore more resistant to being given direction whether 
through the civil service or through political officials coming from the 
prime minister.  
4.1. Soft Steering
One mechanism for addressing the needs of maintaining many of the 
gains of managerial reforms while allowing for greater political steering 
is the development of »soft steering«. The concept of »soft law« has been 
developed to describe (among other cases) patterns of governing within 
the European Union (Mörth, 2004). This idea of »soft law« is analogous 
to Salamon’s (2001) discussion of the »new governance« meaning that 
rather than relying on command and control instruments for governing, 
a shift toward less directive means of steering and indirect control in gov-
ernment is occurring. Salamon’s discussion was primarily in the context of 
popular resistance to »command and control« policy instruments, but the 
logic may be extended to other forms of direct intervention.
By »soft steering« we mean the use of instruments such as benchmarks, 
voluntary agreements, negotiated settlements and a range of other instru-
ments that allow the participants in the policymaking process, and espe-
cially those involved in implementation, to have some latitude in how they 
translate general government goals into action. These actors therefore are 
being steered, but they have mainly the general directions for their action 
determined rather than the details.   
The use of soft steering enables political leaders to influence, if not con-
trol, policy while at the same time also maintaining the autonomy of many 
actors to make their own decisions about how exactly to achieve the goals 
that are set. This balancing of autonomy and control may be difficult to 
maintain in a manner that is agreeable to all the participants. Organiza-
tions and managers will always complain about the control being imposed 
by the political leadership, while political leaders may complain about the 
»shirking and sabotage« of the administrators (Brehm and Gates, 1997).
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Another mechanism for steering from the centre without engaging in direct 
command and control mechanisms over the processes, or to politicize the 
administrative process, is to implement a »priority setting« style of govern-
ance. That is, rather than attempting to make detailed choices about policy 
and the administration of programmes the centre of government may focus 
more on the principal priorities of government and allow the organizations 
involved to make more of their own decisions about implementation.
The attempts of some political leaders to respond to the New Public 
Management through bringing back together a range of programmes and 
structures that had been disaggregated through the reforms of NPM have 
paraded under a number of banners – Joined up Government, the Whole 
of Government, Restoring the Centre – but have shared a common theme 
of attempting to produce more coherent solutions to public policy prob-
lems (Pollitt, 2003). This means that governments establish their major 
priorities and then link the various programs and ministries into those 
more encompassing goals.
The coordination strategy is an important mechanism for asserting the 
priorities of the centre on the remainder of government, but it goes only 
so far in permitting those leaders from imposing their political priorities.7 
If governments can move from a more passive coordination approach to 
a more strategic approach, then they are more capable of imposing their 
goals on the policy system, but again do so through less directive means. 
Not only will such an approach provide opportunities for policy leader-
ship for political executives but it also provides greater opportunities for 
attempts at comprehensive solutions to policy problems.
The senior civil service would play a central role in translating the strategic 
directions from the political leadership into action. Strategic statements 
about policy and government remain just that – statements – unless they 
are implemented. The senior civil service then must translate what may 
be rather abstract policy preferences into effective action. That implies 
not only providing leadership to their own organizations but also working 
across structures to provide more comprehensive governance and policy 
direction for the government as a whole.   
7  Fritz Scharpf (1997) argued that governments engaged in negative coordination in 
which the actors involved knew what each other was doing, and in positive coordination in 
which they had that knowledge and attempted to cooperate. A strategic approach would ex-
tend beyond even the positive approach to coordination to ask questions about the capacity 
to integrate policies around comprehensive and longer-term goals of the political system.
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4.3. The Golden Thread
Yet another means of approaching the general issue of soft-steering is 
to use a »golden thread« to attempt to exert effective control without 
excessive intervention into processes that are intended to be more au-
tonomous. This term has been used by the Danish Ministry of Finance 
(see Jensen, 2006) to identify their strategy of maintaining a relatively 
few lines of control over devolved processes, especially those devolved to 
networks of social actors (see Sorensen and Torfing, 2007). Although the 
threads available to the MoF are relatively few, they are powerful and do 
enable a good deal of steering of the policies and programmes.  
To some extent the same strategy has been applied in steering the nu-
merous devolved agencies that have become common in administrative 
structures around the world. The research that has been done on these or-
ganizations and their autonomy indicates that while they may be granted 
substantial autonomy in a number of areas, their controlling organizations 
– usually a ministry – maintains control over some aspects of the budget, 
or of finance, or perhaps of policy so that the agencies that were designed 
to be autonomous can function in that manner while at the same time also 
conforming to the more general policies of the government.  
4.4. Performance Management
Although performance management has been closely linked with the 
agenda of the New Public Management, it can also be seen as a compo-
nent for the return to steering from the centre. On the one hand, the em-
phasis on performance does tend to drive the actions of organizations and 
individuals within the public sector. This mechanism can be conceived as 
a means for imposing rather stringent controls over the employees in the 
public sector, and use fear as much as more positive motivations to affect 
the behaviours of individuals.
A somewhat less directive conceptualization of performance management 
is also feasible. While much of the traditional practice of public manage-
ment8 has been rather hierarchical and directive, performance manage-
8  Even much of the New Public Management appears to assume a rather directive 
and hierarchical forms of control within the public sector. If the managers are to be al-
lowed to manager, or perhaps ever made to manage, then they need to have the instruments 
through which they can exercise their control.
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ment can be used as a means of providing general policy directions while 
simultaneously permitting individuals and their organizations to make de-
cisions about the means of achieving stated goals. Performance manage-
ment can be seen as specifying broad policy goals and then permitting a 
good deal of latitude in the manner of achieving them. For example, one 
of the policy goals of a sitting government may be to improve »customer« 
service in a policy area. This goal may be achieved through investing heav-
ily in information technology or through investing in personnel, with man-
agers and their political masters having some opportunity for choice.  
As well as being able to provide softer versions of steering to the public 
sector, performance management has the potential to assist in enhancing 
the accountability of the administrative system. Most conventional forms 
of accountability have tended to share with conventional forms of govern-
ance a directive and detailed character. That style of accountability cer-
tainly has its purposes, but also can focus on political embarrassment and 
even the minutiae of administration rather than asking bigger and more 
important questions about overall performance, and about the improve-
ment of performance. As with the basic logic of soft-steering, this form of 
»soft accountability« may in the end produce equally effective results. 
5. Summary and Conclusions
The academic separation of disciplines and sub-disciplines at times masks 
important linkages in the phenomena occurring in the »real world«. In 
the case discussed here, the failure of scholars interested in the political 
executive and those interested in public administration tends to separate 
the two sides of a very important coin in governing.9 For effective govern-
ance these two elements of the executive branch of government must be 
able to work together effectively. They are partners in both making and in 
implementing public policies even though much conventional discussion 
of public administration has tended to emphasize their separation rather 
than their integration.
When one does begin to consider these two elements of the executive 
branch together, the individual developments over the past several dec-
ades present a rather paradoxical picture, and indeed even a contradic-
9  Donald Savoie is one of the relatively few scholars who works on both sides of this 
academic divide.
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tory picture. On the one hand, the »presidentialization« of parliamentary 
governments has tended to emphasize the importance of prime minis-
ters in controlling parliament and cabinet, and portrays these leaders as 
dominant figures in the political landscape. While this literature on prime 
ministers may exaggerate the powers, and the changes in powers, of prime 
ministers, it is important to note the changing character of political execu-
tives.
On the other hand, the administrative literature with its stress on the 
autonomy of many public organizations seems to say that prime ministers 
may have become the Gullivers of their political systems – presumed gi-
ants bound by numerous small constraints so that they are really not as ef-
fective as they might appear. For the purposes of this paper most of those 
constraints arise from the de-centring of many governance processes and 
the autonomy granted to many other organizations within the executive 
branch. Thus, these seemingly dominant figures within the policy proc-
ess may actually not be capable of translating their wishes into effective 
action to the extent that they could when there was a more traditional 
conceptualization of the role of the public service.  
When we do put these two trends within the public sector together, there 
appears to be a disjuncture between these two realities, and a practical need 
to bring the two trends together. The basic argument therefore is that there 
is a need for some actors or institutions to knit together the executive into 
a more coherent instrument for governance, and that the civil service is the 
most appropriate institution for that purpose. To this point in the process 
of transformation much of the reaction from the centre of government has 
been to attempt to utilize direct political control over other parts of govern-
ment.10 That strategy has produced both normative objections and empiri-
cal weaknesses in managing the public sector, and has tended to further to 
denigrate the traditional functions of the civil service.
The implications of these transformations of both politics and adminis-
tration for the senior civil service are to some extent to restore some of 
its traditional role as the link between the political executives and the 
processes of implementation and service delivery. That role of linkage, 
however, has become even more difficult with the increased involvement 
of market and social actors in the processes of governing. The senior civil 
10  This politicization of the public sector has been become more pervasive than one 
might expect in the presumably neutral administrative systems found in most industrialized 
democracies.  
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service has always been in the middle, but now is even more in the posi-
tion of balancing a range of competing pressures and demands. This is, 
perhaps, even greater justification for emphasizing the maintenance of a 
career and stable civil service.  
Stressing the importance of the senior civil service is not to deny »the pri-
macy of politics«, but in some ways is a means of confirming that primacy. 
That is, emphasizing the importance of the civil service linking the policy 
choices of governments to the implementation permits some of the soft-
steering of the administration discussed above. The role of the senior pub-
lic service may be altered from direct control toward those softer mecha-
nisms of controls, but the fundamental linkage required for administering 
the system is little altered. It is a question of steering more cleverly, and 
more softly, rather than not steering at all.   
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AfteR MAnAGeRiAlisM WhAt?  
the RetuRn to PoliticAl And stRAteGic PRioRities
summary
the paper attempts to identify future directions for public administration in the 
context of changes in the political system, and especially changes in the execu-
tive branch of government. Administrative reforms in the past few decades have 
been characterized by the new Public Management, democratic governance, 
public participation, empowerment, etc. At the same time, the political execu-
tive itself has been undergoing a range of significant changes. Also, the role of 
the political executive within the political process has been changing, especially 
within parliamentary systems. »Presidentialization« of politics in parliamentary 
systems is connected with domination of prime ministers over their cabinets and 
political processes in general. the result of such administrative and political 
processes is a paradoxical position of the political leadership that concentrates 
more power on the peak of the political system, while it has diminished power 
over administration and implementation. however, there are some mechanisms 
for maintaining many of the gains of modern administrative reforms while allow-
ing firmer political steering. four of them are analysed: soft steering, priority set-
ting, the use of a »golden thread«, and performance management. Maintenance 
of a career and stable civil service is crucial for resolving disjuncture between 
current political and administrative processes.  
Key words: public administration, administrative reforms, the new Public 
Management, democratic governance, political executives, presidentialization 
of parliamentary systems, public participation, civil service
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Što Poslije jAvnoG MenAdžMentA?  
PovRAtAK PolitičKiM i stRAteŠKiM PRioRitetiMA
sažetak 
u radu se pokušava predvidjeti razvoj javne uprave u kontekstu promjena u 
političkom sustavu, naročito promjena u izvršnoj grani vlasti. upravne promjene 
zadnjih desetljeća karakteriziraju novi javni menadžment, širi krug subjekata u 
javnom upravljanju, sudjelovanje javnosti, ovlašćivanje, itd. istodobno, izvršna 
vlast se značajno mijenja, kao što se mijenja i njezina uloga u političkim 
procesima, naročito u parlamentarnim sustavima. Prezidencijalizacijom poli-
tike u parlamentarnim sustavima označava se dominacija premijera nad vla-
dom i političkim procesima uopće. Rezultat takvih procesa upravnih i političkih 
promjena je paradoksalna pozicija političkog vodstva koje koncentrira više 
vlasti na vrhu političkog sustava, uz istodobno umanjivanje njegove moći nad 
upravom i procesima provedbe javnih politika. ipak, određeni mehanizmi 
omogućavaju zadržavanje mnogih postignuća modernih upravnih reformi isto-
dobno s jačanjem političkog vođenja. Analizirana su četiri takva mehanizma: 
mekše vođenje, utvrđivanje temeljnih političkih prioriteta, upotreba »zlatnog 
mjerila«, te mekše mjere upravljanja izvršenjem. očuvanje karijerne i stabilne 
upravne službe je od ključne važnosti za razrješenje divergentnih političkih i 
upravnih procesa. 
Ključne riječi: javna uprava, upravne reforme, novi javni menadžment, 
demokratsko upravljanje, izvršna vlast, prezidencijalizacija parlamentarnih 
sustava, sudjelovanje javnosti, upravna služba
